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COMMENTS
LOSS ALLOCATION AND REALLOCATION IN MINNESOTA:
A ROAD IN NEED OF REPAIR
[Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986) and
Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 390 N.W.2d 787
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986)]
INTRODUCTION
Allocation of the cost of an injury is a societal concern increasingly
in the public consciousness., Throughout the historical develop-
ment of the law, litigants, the courts, and legislatures have struggled
with the problem of how to equitably apportion the cost of injury
where that injury has been "caused" by another.2 The struggle is
particularly acute when the injured person has contributed to the in-
jury along with multiple tortfeasors.3 The evolution of Minnesota
law is a graphic example. The Minnesota legislature enacted a statu-
tory scheme in 1978 designed to reallocate uncollectible loss. 4 An
examination of the loss reallocation statute, its recent judicial inter-
1. Across America it assumes various forms and goes by various names. In the
state legislatures it is known as tort reform. See Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 455,
1986 Minn. Laws 840; compare Wright, Why Tort Reform is Needed, 43 BENCH & B. MINN.
20 (March 1986) (the current tort system resembles a lottery rather than a compensa-
tion system) with Steenson, Is Tort Reform in MinnesotaJustifed?, 43 BENCH & B. MINN.
21 (March 1986) (the proposed changes will not solve any problems of the perceived
crisis). See, e.g., Church, Sorry Your Policy Is Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16.
2. See generally James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953) (examining
the historical underpinnings and policy reasoning behind the rule of contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery); Lambert, The Common Law is Never Finished (Compara-
tive Negligence on the March), 32 A.T.L. LJ. 741 (1968) (advocating the replacement of
contributory negligence with comparative fault); Leflar, The Declining Defense of Con-
tributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1946-47) (examining the evolution of the con-
tributory negligence rule); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV.
413 (1937) (defining joint and several liability); Steenson, The Fault with Comparative
Fault: The Problem of Individual Comparison in a Modified Comparative Fault Jurisdiction, 12
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1986) (advocating a unit rule for comparison of fault be-
tween a plaintiff and several defendants in a modified comparative fault jurisdiction);
Note, Contribution and Indemnity - An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss
Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 109 (1979) (examining contribution and
indemnity in the context of comparative fault in Minnesota).
3. See generally Steenson, supra note 2.
4. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1978)).
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pretation, and how the two interface with the pre-existing law
presents an opportunity for critical examination of the working of
the entire loss allocation system.
This Comment begins with an examination of the development of
loss allocation principles in Minnesota. A brief overview is given of
the evolution of settlement and release within the context of joint
and several liability, and of comparative fault. Next comes a sum-
mary of the judicial analysis of subdivisions 2 and 35 of Minnesota
Statutes section 604.02 in Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co. ,6 and Frederick-
son v. Alton M. Johnson Co.7 These summaries are followed by the au-
thor's analysis of the net effects of these statutory provisions, as
interpreted by Hosley and Frederickson, upon current tort law in the
personal injury and products liability fields. Finally, the Comment
recommends clarifications and changes needed to effectuate the poli-
cies and principles intended by the rules.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTING POLICIES
A. Settlement and the Pierringer Release
Out of court settlements are favored in the law.8 They compen-
sate the victim, more fairly allocate the cost of injury among the re-
sponsible parties, and decrease the cost of dispute resolution.9
Minnesota courts have consistently supported and encouraged
settlement.10
Despite the advantages of settlement in the classic scenario of one
plaintiff versus one defendant, the common law rendered harsh re-
sults where joint or co-tortfeasors were involved."1 Pursuant to old
common law principles, the effect of giving a release to a defendant
was to surrender an entire cause of action.12 Hence, the release of
one tortfeasor was the release of all.13
The Minnesota Bar has created various devices to circumvent the
5. Minnesota Statutes section 604.02 was first codified in 1978. It has not been
amended since its initial enactment.
6. 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).
7. 390 N.W.2d 786 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
8. E.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 299 Minn. 103, 107, 216 N.W.2d 669, 671 (1974);
Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 314, 50
N.W.2d 689, 695 (1951).
9. See generally Simonett, Release ofJoint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer Release in
Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Schmidt, 299 Minn. at 107, 216 N.W.2d at 671; Employers Mut. Casualty
Co., 235 Minn. at 314, 50 N.W.2d at 695.
11. See Simonett, supra note 9, at 12.
12. For a detailed examination of the development of this rule, see Prosser, supra
note 2, at 421-25.
13. Id.
[Vol. 13
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harshness of this rule. These include the covenant not to sue, 14 high-
low agreements,' 5 and loan receipts.16 Minnesota is a joint and sev-
eral liability jurisdiction,17 however, and none of these devices afford
either party adequate protection. This was particularly true after
1969 and the advent of comparative negligence.' 8 Settling defend-
ants desire a complete release in exchange for settlement proceeds.
A covenant not to sue leaves the settling defendant vulnerable to a
claim for contribution from a non-settling defendant.19 Yet, the
plaintiff cannot release the settling defendant without risking loss of
14. A covenant not to sue is an agreement between a plaintiff and a settling joint
tortfeasor. The plaintiff agrees not to commence or continue "prosecution of any
action based upon a disputed claim" in return for a specified sum of money. See, e.g.,
Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 121, 64 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 (1954); Joyce v.
Massachusetts Real Estate Co., 173 Minn. 310, 311-12, 217 N.W. 337, 338 (1928);
Musolf v. Duluth Edison Elec. Co., 108 Minn. 369, 377, 122 N.W. 499, 502 (1909).
The agreement need not reserve the right to sue other joint tortfeasors for that right
to be effective. The reservation of that right is, however, important in determining
whether the parties to the covenant intended to preserve those other claims or
whether they intended complete settlement of plaintiff's entire claim, thereby releas-
ing the other joint tortfeasors as well. SeeJoyce, 173 Minn. at 312-13, 217 N.W. at
338-39. Contra Musolf, 108 Minn. at 375-76, 122 N.W. at 502 ("reservation of the
right to sue other joint tort-feasors is obviously necessary to a covenant not to sue").
A covenant not to sue does not protect a settling tortfeasor from the later contribu-
tion claims of other joint tortfeasors. See Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 235 Minn. at
314, 50 N.W.2d at 695.
15. In a high-low agreement, a plaintiff and defendant set minimum and maxi-
mum limits on the ultimate award regardless of the jury verdict or arbitration award.
The defendant pays the minimum amount at the time of settlement, the remainder to
be paid at the time of the verdict or arbitration award. See Finz, A Trial Where Both
Sides Win, 59 JUDICATURE 41, 42 (June-July 1975); Robinson, High-Low Arbitration - A
Settlement Technique, 11 FORUM 476, 476-77 (1976).
16. A loan receipt involves settlement through the use of a noninterest loan.
The settling defendant loans an interest free sum of money to the plaintiff. In return,
the plaintiff agrees to pursue claims against the non-settling defendants and promises
to repay the loan from any judgment obtained against the non-settling defendants.
The plaintiff is not obligated to repay the loan from any portion of a judgment ex-
ceeding the amount of the loan. See, e.g., Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 5 Ill.2d 356, 358, 303 N.E.2d 382, 383-84 (1973).
17. "Joint and several liability" is a concept that originated in two separate doc-
trines. "Joint tortfeasors" whose common enterprise or conspiracy caused injury
were each liable for the plaintiff's entire loss. Prosser, supra note 2, at 414. As proce-
dural rules were liberalized, merely concurrent tortfeasors could be joined causing
"joined" and "joint" to become confused. Id. at 420-22. The result was joint and
several liability as we know it today: where the acts of two or more persons converge
to cause harm, each is jointly and severally liable for the entire loss. Id.
18. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 (1986)). For a detailed examination of the development of compara-
tive fault in Minnesota, see generally Note, The Scope of Comparative Fault in Minnesota,
9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 299 (1984).
19. See generally Note, supra note 18.
1987]
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her claims against the remaining defendants.20 It was not until 1978
and the judicial endorsement of the Pierringer21 release that an equi-
table balance was struck. 22
The Pierringer release, named after the Wisconsin case that en-
dorsed its use, is designed to effectively cut off the liability of a set-
tlingjoint defendant-tortfeasor.23 It preserves the remainder of the
plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendants24 and guarantees
that the non-settling defendant tortfeasor will not pay more than its
"fair share" of the damages.25 The release consists of three parts:
(1) release of the settling defendant by discharge of that part of the
cause of action equal to the settling defendant's causal fault; (2) res-
ervation by the plaintiff of "the balance of the whole cause of action"
against the non-settling joint tortfeasors; and (3) an indemnification
agreement whereby the plaintiff indemnifies the settling defendant
from any claims of contribution made by the non-settling parties.26
The Pierringer release modifies the rule ofjoint and several liability to
allow piecemeal settlement of suits.27 In effect, it allows the parties
to sever the total cause of action into segments of individual fault,
each defendant being assured that it will pay no more than its agreed
proportion of the total damage.
The parties entering into a Pierringer release accept the risk that
their calculation of the fault distribution and the total damage may
differ from what is ultimately determined, to the detriment of one
party or the other.28 Courts have upheld such agreements, 29 noting
20. Id.
21. Pierringer releases were named after the Wisconsin case in which they were
first judicially recognized, Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106
(1963). Its use was endorsed in Minnesota in Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918
(Minn. 1978).
22. For a thorough discussion of the theoretical basis for and operation of the
Pierninger release, see generally Simonett, supra note 9.
23. Id. at 3-4.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 9.
28. The settling parties take the calculated risk that their assessment of the value
of the total damages and their assessment of the settling tortfeasor's degree of fault is
reasonably accurate. Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 390 N.W.2d 786, 789
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) provides a good example of the import of a miscalculation.
The plaintiff settled with defendant Hunt on a Pierringer release prior to trial. Freder-
ickson received $20,000 in return for the release of Hunt. The jury awarded total
damages of $800,000 and assigned Hunt 40 percent of the fault. Thus, Hunt had
paid $20,000 for release of its $320,000 share. A defendant, of course, faces the
same risk in reverse.
29. See, e.g., Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 294 (Minn. 1986);
Lange v. Schweitzer, 295 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 1980).
[Vol. 13
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that the risk was contemplated as part of the bargain.3O Joint and
several liability between all defendants remains.31 An injured plain-
tiff is not compelled to enter into this modification of the rule. The
risk that the plaintiff will miscalculate the fault allocation, and end up
less than fully compensated, is one undertaken voluntarily.
B. Comparative Fault and Loss Reallocation
At common law, any negligence on the part of an injured person
that contributed to an injury served as a complete bar to recovery of
damages.32 This was true no matter how disparate the degrees of
fault; if an injured plaintiff was found to be five percent at fault in
causing injury, even though another party was ninty-five percent at
fault, the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action.
The harsh effects of such a rule are obvious. The Minnesota Legis-
lature responded in 1969 with the enactment of the Comparative
Negligence Statute,33 modeled after Wisconsin law.34 For the first
time, negligence of a plaintiff contributing to her own injury was not
a total bar to recovery. A plaintiff was allowed to recover damages
where her contributory negligence was less than that of a
defendant.35
It soon became evident that the statutory enactment was not
drafted broadly enough. As the area of products liability developed,
courts were faced with new legal theories, such as strict liability for
defective products, which did not fit within the current statutory
scheme.3 6 In response, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the Com-
30. Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 294.
31. Id. at 292; cf. Lange, 295 N.W.2d at 390 (plaintiff who had released defendant
on a Pierringer release was obligated to satisfy the contribution claims of the non-
settling defendants; joint and several liability, a prerequisite for a contribution claim,
is impliedly retained).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965) (bar against negligent de-
fendant). See generally Leflar, supra note 2; Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO.
L.J. 674 (1934).
33. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1986)). Subdivision 1 of the statute reads:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering . . . . When there are two or more
persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in propor-
tion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided, how-
ever, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.
Id.
34. Compare MINN. STAT. § 604.01 with WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
35. MINN. STAT. § 604.01.
36. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977)
1987]
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parative Fault Act of 1978. The 1978 Act made three changes in
Minnesota law. First, it increased the scope of the former statute by
providing for a comparison of fault rather than negligence.3 7 The
change significantly expanded the theories of recovery and defenses
subject to comparison. Second, the Act adopted a modified form of
comparative fault already in use in Wisconsin.38 Rather than bar a
claimant from recovery if her fault equaled or exceeded that of the
person from whom recovery is sought, the statute now provides that
a claimant is not barred from recovery unless her fault is greater than
the fault of the person from whom recovery is sought.3 9 Third, the
Act provides for a reallocation scheme in the event that a portion of
the judgment is found to be uncollectible.40
(concerning the apportionment of fault between a negligent plaintiff and a strictly
liable manufacturer); cf. Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362, 367-68
(Minn. 1977) (concerning contribution between parties in a chain of distribution).
37. The new Comparative Fault Act contained the following definition of "fault":
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, mis-
use of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the
basis for liability and to contributory fault.
Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. la (1986)).
38. Compare MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1978) with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West 1983).
39. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1986)). The 1978 amendment eliminated
the clause "as great as" and inserted the clause "greater than" into the first sentence
of the subdivision. 1978 Minn. Laws at 839. This portion of the amendment seems
to have been legislative acknowledgement of the commonplace reality that juries
often apportion liability equally between plaintiff and defendant, a result which often
precluded the plaintiff from any recovery.
40. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 8, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subds. 2, 3 (1986). The general reallocation pro-
vision found in subdivision 2 comes directly from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
section 2(d), 2 U.L.A. 37, 41 (Supp. 1985):
Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is entered, the
court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of the
obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncol-
lectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, ac-
cording to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing lia-
bility to the claimant on the judgment.
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2 (1986). Subdivision 3 is unique to Minnesota. It ap-
pears to be specifically designed to contain uncollectible loss that occurs within the
chain of manufacture and distribution within that chain. It reads as follows:
In the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consump-
tion of a product, an amount uncollectible from any person in the chain of
manufacture and distribution shall be reallocated among all other persons
in the chain of manufacture and distribution but not among the claimant or
[Vol. 13
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The predecessor to Minnesota's reallocation provisions was con-
tribution.41 Pursuant to the early common law rule, no contribution
existed among joint tortfeasors.42 An injured plaintiff could elect to
bring suit against any of several potentially liable tortfeasors.43 That
tortfeasor was obligated to pay the entire judgment, yet was not enti-
tled to any reimbursement from another wrongdoer who might be
equally or more responsible for causing the plaintiff's loss.44 Equity
focused upon the rights of the injured party. The thrust of the law
was to fully compensate the victim of the wrong. Thus, the injured
party's rights were not affected by the inability of ajoint tortfeasor to
secure contribution from other wrongdoers.45
Contribution developed in Minnesota as an equitable remedy to
the basic unfairness of the former common law rule.46 Like indem-
nity,47 contribution is a remedy that distributes fault among multiple
tortfeasors. It shifts a portion of the injured party's loss from the
tortfeasor who has paid an excessive proportion of a judgment to
another joint tortfeasor. It was developed to more fairly allocate the
cost of an injury among those responsible for its cause. It was not,
however, intended to affect the rights of the injured party.48
others at fault who are not in the chain of manufacture or distribution of the
product. Provided, however, that a person whose fault is less than that of a
claimant is liable to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment which
represents the percentage of fault attributable to him.
Id. § 604.02, subd. 3 (1986).
41. Contribution is an equitable remedy used to distribute fault among joint
tortfeasors. It shifts a portion of the injured party's loss from one co-tortfeasor to
another co-tortfeasor. For an in-depth discussion of the development of the doc-
trine, see generally Note, supra note 2, at 109.
42. Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L.
REV. 470, 470-71 (1953).
43. See, e.g., Nees v. Minneapolis St. P. Ry., 218 Minn. 532, 541, 16 N.W.2d 758,
763 (1944). ("[T]he injured person may ... sue the actors jointly or severally and
recover against one or all.").
44. Id. at 541, 16 N.W.2d at 763-64.
45. Id. at 541, 16 N.W.2d at 764. ("[T]he question of liability as between the two
tortfeasors is immaterial in determining the liability of either to the injured
person.").
46. E.g., Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 417, 236 N.W. 766,
767 (1931). Minnesota was one of only six jurisdictions to permit contribution
among unintentional tortfeasors. Note, supra note 42, at 471 n. 10.
47. Indemnity shifts the injured party's entire loss from one co-tortfeasor to an-
other. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 287 Minn. 264, 267, 178
N.W.2d 620, 623 (1970) ("[I]ndemnity is the ... action for restitution of the whole
amount paid by one party in satisfaction of an obligation of the other party"); Ameri-
can Mut. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 508-09, 122 N.W.2d 178,
182 (1963). For a general discussion of the doctrine of indemnity, see Bohlen, Contri-
bution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1936).
48. Nees, 218 Minn. at 541, 16 N.W.2d at 764.
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II. THE JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF Loss REALLOCATION
In Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co. 49 and Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson
Co. 50 the Minnesota appellate courts grappled for the first time with
the general reallocation provision found in Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 604.02, subdivision 2,51 and the special loss reallocation provi-
sion for products liability cases found in Minnesota Statutes section
604.02, subdivision 3.52 As the first judicial review of significant stat-
utory law, these interpretations have significance in and of them-
selves. When viewed from a broader perspective, however, Hosley
and Frederickson become more than a reading and individual applica-
tion of statutory law. The cases necessarily address the principles of
joint and several liability,53 comparative fault,54 settlement,55 prod-
ucts liability,56 contribution,57 indemnity,58 and reallocation of un-
collectible loss.59 In each case, virtually all of the equitable remedies
of modern tort law converge in a single set of facts. It is the author's
contention that the result is needlessly complex and less than
equitable.
A. Subdivision 2: Hosley
Patrick Hosley was employed for thirty years as an insulator.60 Af-
ter contracting asbestosis, he commenced suit against thirteen asbes-
tos manufacturers.61 He alleged that exposure to asbestos products
while on the job caused his illness.62 After he filed suit, two of the
defendants, Johns-Manville Corp. (Johns-Manville) and Unarco In-
dustries filed for bankruptcy. 6 3 The trial court severed all of the
claims against these two defendants and allowed Hosley to proceed
49. 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).
50. 390 N.W.2d 786 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
51. Supra note 40.
52. Id.
53. Supra note 17.
54. See generally supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
55. See generally supra notes 8-31 and accompanying text.
56. See generally Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota: Principles of
Loss Allocation, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 243 (1980).
57. See generally supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
58. Supra note 47.
59. Supra note 40.
60. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 364 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
aff'd in part, revd in part, 383 N.W.2d 289 (Minn. 1986).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The two corporations filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp.
1985)). The proceedings were stayed pursuant to the automatic stay provision, 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 290.
[Vol. 13
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against the rest.6 4 By the end of trial, all the defendants except Pitts-
burgh Corning Corporation (Pittsburgh Corning) settled by means
of a Pierringer release.65
The jury considered the fault of all the parties, and awarded Hos-
ley $350,000 damages.66 Eight of the original defendants and the
plaintiff were found to be at fault. 67 Among those at fault were Pitts-
burgh Coming and Johns-Manville. In allocating the damages, the
trial court first reduced the total award by the proportionate shares
of Hosley and the settling defendants.68 It then determined that
Pittsburgh Corning andJohns-Manville were jointly and severally lia-
ble for the remainder.69 Without making a determination on the
question of uncollectibility, the trial court calculated the reallocation
distribution in the event that Johns-Manville's share was later deter-
mined to be uncollectible.70 It then stayed Hosley's share of this
reallocation. 71
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed two issues:
64. Hosley, 364 N.W.2d at 815.
65. Id. For the contents of the release see infra note 103.
66. Hosley, 364 N.W.2d at 815.
67. Id. The jury found the plaintiff and eight of the thirteen named defendants
to be at fault. They allocated fault as follows:
Patrick Hosley 7%
Celotex Corporation 5%
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. 9%
Fibreboard Corporation 15%
Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc. 5%
Johns-Manville Sales Corporation 25%
MacArthur Corporation 9%
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation 15%
Pittsburgh Coming Corporation 10%
100%
Id.
68. Id. This was a reduction of $227,500 for the combined 58 percent fault of
the released defendants and seven percent fault of Hosley himself.
69. Id.
70. Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 2 clearly states that a determi-
nation of uncollectibility must be made by the court upon the motion of a party
within one year from the entry of judgment. No such motion was made in this case,
nor was a definitive determination of uncollectibility. As noted by Judge Crippen in
his dissenting opinion, the trial court's decision to stay collection of Hosley's portion
ofJohns-Manville's 25 percent was premature. Hosley, 364 N.W.2d at 819 n.2 (Crip-
pen J., dissenting).
The court of appeals recently confirmed Judge Crippen's position. On remand,
Hosley went before the district court for a reallocation of damages consistent with the
supreme court's 1986 decision. Judge Crippen wrote the appellate court opinion
affirming the trial court's finding that where a party to the transaction is not a party to
the lawsuit, a determination of uncollectibility as to that party is premature. Hosley
v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., No. C-3-86-1429, slip op. at - (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 24,
1987) The trial court cannot determine whether or not the claim against that party is
collectible until a judgment has been entered against that party. Id.
71. Hosley, 364 N.W.2d at 815.
1987]
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1) the effect of Pierringer releases on joint and several liability, and
2) the applicability of the statutory loss reallocation provisions to
persons no longer parties to a lawsuit.72 The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court on the first issue and held that execution of a
Pierringer release did not destroy joint and several liability.73 The
court stated that a contrary decision would unfairly penalize plaintiffs
and discourage settlement.74
The court of appeals reversed the trial court on the second issue
and held that the principal reallocation provision does not apply to a
person severed from the lawsuit. 7 5 The court noted the distinct
change in wording between the three subdivisions of Minnesota Stat-
utes section 604.02. In subdivisions 1 and 3, the legislature used the
word "person." 76 In subdivision 2, the general reallocation provi-
sion, the legislature used the word "party." 7 7 Following traditional
rules of statutory construction, the court reasoned that this distinc-
tion in language demanded a distinction in meaning.7 8 The court,
therefore, held that the reallocation provison did not apply to Johns-
Manville, the severed bankrupt tortfeasor no longer a party to the
lawsuit.79
Having determined that the loss reallocation statute did not apply,
the court of appeals went on to consider reallocation of this poten-
tially "uncollectible" portion of the judgment under common law
principles. Restating that Pittsburgh Corning and Johns-Manville
were jointly and severally liable for the whole of plaintiff's damages,
the court determined that Pittsburgh Coming should receive "equi-
table contribution" from those defendants more at fault than the
plaintiff.80
The parties raised the same issues on appeal to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.81 The supreme court affirmed both the trial court
and the court of appeals on the first issue.82 It reversed the court of
appeals on the second.8 3
The Hosley decision marks an emphatic re-affirmation of the con-
tinuing viability of joint and several liability in Minnesota.84 The
72. See id.
73. Id. at 816.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 817.
81. Hosley, 383 N.W,2d at 292.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 293.
84. Id. at 292.
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Comparative Fault Act expressly preserves it.85 According to the
supreme court, a Pierringer release cannot destroy it.86
The supreme court next addressed the applicability of the reallo-
cation statute provisions to severed tortfeasors.87 The court first ac-
knowledged the use of the word "parties" in subdivision 2, the
general reallocation provision, as opposed to the word "persons"
used in subdivisions 1 and 3, discussing joint and several liability and
the products liability reallocation provisions respectively. 8 8 The
court recognized the general rule of statutory construction used by
the court of appeals in declaring the provision inapplicable; such dis-
tinctions in language are presumed intentional.89 The court further
noted that the comment to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (Uni-
form Act), on which the Minnesota statute was based, expressly
states that the reallocation provision was meant to apply only to par-
ties joined in a lawsuit.90 Yet, the Hosley court held that the realloca-
tion provision does apply to tortfeasors no longer parties to the
lawsuit, as long as they are "parties to the transaction."91 The
supreme court relied on Lines v. Ryan,9 2 a case decided under the
comparative negligence statute, which held that the negligence of
"parties to the transaction" should be submitted to the jury for fault
allocation.93 The language in the comment to the Uniform Act re-
lied upon by the court of appeals was succinctly dismissed.94
The court pointed out that the formulators of the Uniform Act
were concerned about determining the liability of a person not
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 292-93.
89. Id.
90. The comment to the reallocation section of the Uniform Act states:
The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons who
may have been at fault with regard to the particular injury but who have not
been joined as parties. This is a deliberate decision. It cannot be told with cer-
tainty whether that person was actually at fault or what amount of fault
should be attributed to him or whether the statute of limitations will run on
him, etc. An attempt to settle these matters in a suit to which he is not a
party would not be binding on him. Both plaintiff and defendants will have
significant incentive forjoining available defendants who may be liable. The
more parties joined whose fault contributed to the injury, the smaller the
percentage of fault allocated to each of the other parties, whether plaintiff or
defendant
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, comment, 12 U.L.A. 37, 41 (Supp. 1986) (em-
phasis added).
91. Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 293.
92. 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978).
93. Id. at 902-03.
94. "[T]he concerns expressed in the comment to the Uniform Act have no ap-
plicability here." Hoslev, 383 N.W.2d at 293.
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before the court.95 Citing Lines, the supreme court noted that pursu-
ant to Minnesota law the determination of fault made by ajury for an
absent defendant is not an establishment of liability.96 Rather, it
makes the assigned percentage the maximum fault of the absent
party in a future suit. 9 7 The purpose of the language distinction as
set forth by the commentators to the Uniform Act is not needed
under Minnesota law.98 The court thus refused to use the "restric-
tive definition" of the word "parties" and "thwart the legislature's
creation of a fair method of distributing the risk of uncollectible obli-
gations under the comparative fault scheme."99 The general reallo-
cation provision contained in subdivision 2 of Minnesota Statutes,
section 604.02, was found applicable to all "parties to the transac-
tion," including those which, for one reason or another, are not par-
ties to the lawsuit.10o Based on this analysis, the supreme court did
not need to address the issue of equitable contribution. 101
Having held that the principal loss reallocation provision was ap-
plicable to the uncollectible share of a severed party, the Hosley court
calculated the reallocation. The statute provides that the uncollecti-
ble amount is to be reallocated among all remaining parties accord-
ing to their respective fault, including the plaintiff.102 Hosley's
recovery was therefore reduced by his proportionate share of Johns-
Manville's uncollectible amount.10 3 This was precisely what had
been done by the trial court.
The supreme court, however, went on to examine the final piece in
the loss allocation puzzle: what effect does a Pierringer release have
on the reallocation process? The releases used in Hosley contained
standard indemnification language plus a specific agreement to in-
demnify the settling defendants for any loss reallocation.104 All par-
ties were cognizant of Johns-Manville's bankruptcy petition at the
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 295.
102. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2 (1984).
103. Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 294 n.3. Hosley's share ofJohns-Manville's 25 percent
was 7/75 of $87,500, or $8,166.67. Id.
104. The releases provided in part:
Releasors agree to satisfy any future judgment which may be rendered in
favor of Releasors, in such fraction, portion or percentage of the judgment
as the causal fault of [defendant] is adjudged to be of all causal fault of all
persons adjudged responsible for Releasor's damages. It is also agreed and
understood that this Release and Indemnification Agreement encompasses any and all
claims based on the amount Of any subsequent judgment determined to be uncollectible in
accordance with Minn. Stat. 604.02 (1980), and reallocated to [defendant].
Id. at 294 (emphasis in original).
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time the releases were negotiated.105 The court had little difficulty,
therefore, enforcing the explicit agreement of the parties. 106 Johns-
Manville's twenty-five percent of the verdict was distributed among
all parties in proportion to their respective degree of fault.107 Since
Hosley was indemnified through the release of all defendants other
than Pittsburgh Coming, he absorbed all but ten percent of the un-
collectible portion of the judgment.10 8
B. Subdivision 3: Frederickson
Gary Frederickson was severely burned in an electrical fire.109
The fire resulted from an electrical explosion which occurred when
he attempted to install a fuse in an electrical cabinet.I 1o Frederick-
son sued Michaud, Cooley, Hallberg, Erickson & Associates, Inc.
(MCHE), the electrical engineering firm that designed the electrical
system involved, Alton M. Johnson Co. (Johnson), the electrical cabi-
net manufacturer, and Hunt Electric Co. (Hunt), the installer of the
cabinet.111 Prior to trial, Frederickson settled with Hunt on a Pier-
ringer release. 12
The fault of all parties was submitted to the jury. 13 The jury ren-
dered a verdict awarding the plaintiff $800,000 damages and appor-
105. All parties were involved in the suit at the time Johns-Manville declared
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Their awareness is further substantiated by the express ref-
erence to reallocation in the releases. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Hosley absorbed his own seven percent share of fault ($24,500) plus the 58
percent allocated to the settling defendants ($203,000). Id. at 290. He also absorbed
his allocated share of Johns-Manville's 25 percent of fault ($8,166.67) plus the set-
tling defendants' allocated share ($67,666.66). Id. at 294 n.3. In total, Hosley ab-
sorbed $303,333.33, due, in most part, to the Pierringer releases.
Pittsburgh Corning Corp. was liable for its 10 percent of fault ($35,000). Id. at
290. In addition, it was liable for its allocated share ofJohns-Manville's 25 percent of
fault ($11,666.67). Id. at 294 n.3. In total, the judgment against Pittsburgh Corning
Corp. amounted to $46,666.67.
Hosley received a total of $72,500 in consideration for the Pierringer releases. See
Brief for Appellant at A5-8, Hosley, 364 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). He has
recovered $119,166.67 ($46,666.67 plus $72,500) out of a $350,000 damage award.
Had all defendants been solvent, and had he not settled on Pierringer releases, judg-
ment would have been entered for $325,500 (total award of $350,000 minus $24,500
for his own share of fault). See Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 290. Between the settlements
and the application of the loss reallocation provision in subdivision 2 of Minnesota
Statutes, section 604.02, Hosley lacks full compensation by $325,500 minus
$119,166.67, or $206,333.33.
109. 390 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
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tioned fault among all parties, including the plaintiff., 14
The trial court reduced the award by forty-eight percent, which
was the combined fault of Frederickson and the indemnified Hunt,
and ordered judgment against Johnson and MCHE, jointly and sev-
erally, for fifty-two percent of the verdict.tt5 The trial court ulti-
mately decided that Johnson's forty percent share was uncollectible
and not reallocable to MCHE.116
On appeal, one of the issues addressed was whether Johnson's un-
collectible forty percent share was reallocable to MCHE.II7 The
court of appeals turned to the special reallocation provision for
products liability claims found in subdivision 3 of Minnesota Stat-
utes, section 604.02, which provides that an uncollectible amount
from a person in the chain of manufacture and distribution "shall be
reallocated among all other persons in the chain of manufacture and
distribution but not among the claimant or others at fault who are not in the
chain of manufacture or distribution of the product. " 118 The court noted
first that Frederickson's claim against Johnson was a products liabil-
ity claim, arising out of the manufacture and sale of a defective elec-
trical cabinet.119 Frederickson's claim against MCHE, however, was
a claim for defective services.120 MCHE was, therefore, not in the
chain of manufacture or distribution.121 Johnson's uncollectible
114. The jury allocated fault as follows:
Frederickson 8%
Hunt 40%
Johnson 40%
MCHE 12%
Id. at 789.
115. Fifty-two percent of the verdict amounted to $416,000. Id.
116. Id. at 790. The word "uncollectible" is not defined anywhere in Minnesota
Statutes, section 604.02. See Steenson, Comparative Fault and Loss Allocation, 6 MINN.
TRIAL LAW. 8 (1981). Both the Hosley court and the Frederickson court declined to
define it. It seems clear that "uncollectible" would include a defendant who is (1) im-
mune, (2) bankrupt, (3) not liable to the plaintiff, i.e., less at fault than the plaintiff,
see Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components, 304 N.W.2d 346, 352 & n.5
(Minn. 1981) (one defendant liable for entire amount of plaintiff's damages, where
defendant's liability greater than plaintiff's), or (4) possibly a defendant employer
who has paid partial damages through workers' compensation, see Lambertson v.
Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 119-30, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684-89 (1977) (contribu-
tion awarded against employer to extent of employer's workers' compensation liabil-
ity). In Frederickson, the trial court made the determination of Johnson's
uncollectibility on the basis of a financial statement from the company, submitted in
the form of an affidavit. Telephone interview with Howard P. Helgen, counsel for
Gary Frederickson (Oct. 1, 1986)[hereinafter Helgen interview].
117. Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 790.
118. Id. at 792 (citing MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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share could not be reallocated to them.122
In a footnote, the court of appeals expressly declined to offer an
opinion "as to whether Johnson's uncollectible share can be reallo-
cated to Hunt or whether Frederickson, through his Pierringer re-
lease, agreed to pay Hunt's share of any uncollectible obligation
reallocated to Hunt."' 2 3 Which of the remaining parties will ulti-
mately absorb the $320,000 unallocated loss has yet to be
determined.
III. THE NET RESULT
While the Hosley and Frederickson cases clarify some of the confu-
sion surrounding the reallocation statute, they raise many questions.
These interpreted provisions affect the law in three major areas.
The first area of impact is most readily described by example. Two
plaintiffs, A and B, both partially at fault and both injured by a defec-
tive or inherently dangerous product, face the distinct possibility of
very different treatment under the law if one of the tortfeasors is in-
solvent. Plaintiff A, injured over a period of time by exposure to
some type of toxic chemical or drug, falls under the general loss real-
location provision found in subdivision 2 of the statute.' 24 This oc-
curs because under such circumstances the defendants are most
likely to be independent manufacturers of the toxic substance125
rather than a chain of manufacturers, distributors, and middleper-
sons. In the event that one of the tortfeasors becomes insolvent and
a determination of uncollectibility is made, plaintiff A absorbs part of
the risk of that insolvency. 126 This is true even though the plaintiff is
not fully compensated for her damages.127
Plaintiff B, injured by a defective or inherently dangerous product
in a single accident rather than through long term exposure, falls
under the special loss reallocation provision found in subdivision 3
of the statute.1 28 In the event that one of the tortfeasors in the chain
becomes insolvent and a determination of uncollectibility is made,
plaintiff B does not absorb any of the risk.' 29
Both scenarios are products liability cases. In each, the plaintiff
was partially at fault. In each, the plaintiff was injured by a defective
122. Id.
123. Id. at 792 n.2.
124. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2.
125. The multiple asbestos manufacturers in Hosley are typical of this type of litiga-
tion. The thousands of suits surrounding DES exposure, in which the defendants are
usually a long list of DES manufacturers, is another cogent example.
126. See Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 293.
127. Id.
128. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2.
129. See Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 792.
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or inherently dangerous product. There seems to be no justification
for treating them differently. It would seem that the sole difference
is the lack of a chain of manufacture in plaintiff A's situation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Hosley read the word "parties"
right out of the reallocation statute,' 3 0 and replaced it with a phrase
synonymous with "persons."lSI The Hosley court reasoned that the
intent of the legislature to create "a fair method of distributing the
risk of uncollectible obligations under the comparative fault
scheme"132 was more important than a literal reading of the statu-
tory language. Where the literal words of the statute prevented the
implementation of the equitable result it was designed to shape, the
court followed the equitable intent.lSS It read the words broadly
enough to facilitate the intended result.t3 4 The Minnesota courts
should also read subdivision 3 broadly enough to ensure that plain-
tiffs A and B receive the same treatment.
The exact origin of subdivision 3 of the reallocation statute is un-
known.135 The provision is, however, consistent with existing prod-
uct liability doctrine.13 6 Business enterprises are expected to bear
the burden of the cost of consumer injuries as a part of the cost of
doing business.137 The protection of the injured consumer is the
first priority.138 The fact that subdivision 3 contains the words
"chain of manufacture and distribution"139 should not render a re-
sult contrary to the thrust of the entire provision. Subdivision 3
should be read broadly enough to facilitate equal treatment of all
products liability cases. Any other interpretation results in arbitrary
distinctions of potentially major impact,140 which the legislature
130. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 2.
131. See Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 293.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. The comparative fault bill presented to the senate contained the basis of
what became subdivision 3. While on the senate floor, the bill was amended follow-
ing discussion by Senators Sieloff and Davies about the impact of the loss realloca-
tion provisions on low volume sellers within the manufacture-distribution chain.
Thus, there exists some guidance for interpretation of the amended form of subdivi-
sion 3. See Debate on H.F. No. 338 Before the Minnesota Senate, 70th Minn. Leg.,
1978 Sess., Mar. 16, 1978 (audio tape) (available at Legislative Library, Minnesota
State Capitol). For a more expanded presentation of the background of the bill, see
Steenson, supra note 56, at 9-12.
136. See generally, Steenson, supra note 56, at 326-50.
137. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 96, at 682 (5th ed. 1985).
138. Id. at 135; MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3.
139. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3.
140. An example will illuminate the impact. Assume the following facts. Plaintiff
(P) brings a claim against defendants DI, D2 and D3, all asbestos manufacturers. (P)
is found to be 20 percent at fault, DI 30 percent, D2 25 percent and D3 25 percent.
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could not have intended.
The second area of impact comes into the analysis of party align-
ment on the outcome of a case. Where there are multiple claims
against multiple defendants, which include strict products liability
and ordinary negligence,141 application of subdivision 3 leads to
anomalous results addressed by either the legislature or the appel-
late courts. In the event that an uncollectible loss occurs within the
chain of manufacture, subdivision 3 mandates that reallocation of
that loss be made solely within the chain.142 This severs joint and
several liability on the part of any defendants liable to the plaintiff
who are outside the chain. Frederickson is illustrative. Frederickson's
claim against MCHE was a negligence claim.143 His claims against
Johnson and Hunt were products liability claims based upon the
manufacture, sale, and installation of a defective electrical cabinet. 144
Johnson's share was determined to be uncollectible. 145 Johnson was
the manufacturer of the cabinet.146 Pursuant to subdivision 3, Hunt
as the installer was the only defendant to which the loss could be
reallocated.147 In Frederickson, the question of how Johnson's loss
will be reallocated has not yet been determined.148 The only thing
that has been definitively determined is that reallocation cannot be
made to MCHE. 14 9
Only two parties remain to apportion the damage award. If the
Pierringer release is interpreted to mean that the plaintiff has agreed
to indemnify the settling tortfeasor for reallocation as well as contri-
bution, the plaintiff absorbs the uncollectible loss.150 Such a result is
The damages verdict is $400,000. Within one year, D2's 25 percent is found to be
uncollectible. If D2's 25 percent is reallocated pursuant to subdivision 2, P absorbs
20/75 or $42,666.66. If, however, DI and D2 were the manufacturers and distribu-
tors of the same asbestos product, D2's uncollectible 25 percent would be reallocated
pursuant to subdivision 3. P absorbs nothing, and is fully compensated for her in-
jury. Both scenarios involve the same plaintiff, the same injury, and the same causa-
tive agent.
141. This is precisely the alignment in Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 792. Frederick-
son's claims against Johnson and Hunt arose from the manufacture, sale, and instal-
lation of a defective electrical cabinet. His claim against defendant MCHE was based
upon negligent services. Id.
142. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3.
143. Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 792.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 792 n.2.
149. Id. at 792.
150. In Frederickson, if the Pierringer release given to Hunt is interpreted to include
an indemnification agreement for reallocation as well as contribution, the plaintiff
will asborb an additional $320,000. Hunt paid the plaintiff $20,000 for the release.
Id. at 789-90.
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directly contrary to the intent of the legislature in drafting the provi-
sion. Initially, the plaintiff was not to absorb the loss. Furthermore,
despite the holding by the trial court that the defendants were jointly
and severally liable,151 under such a scheme the joint liability of the
negligent MCHE has in reality been severed from the liability of the
other defendants, to the detriment of the injured party.152
The Minnesota Court of Appeals characterizes subdivision 2 of the
statute as a modification of the rule ofjoint and several liability.'53 It
calls subdivision 3 a further modification of the rule. 15 4 In a lawsuit
with multiple defendants and multiple claims, some products liability
and some not, this "further modification" is in reality a burial.
There is an additional related issue important to the working of
the reallocation statute as a whole that was not raised in either Hosley
or Frederickson. In the event that an uncollectible loss in a chain of
manufacture cannot be reallocated to another person in the chain,
where does the loss fall? The statute is silent on this issue. The only
interpretation that comports with the supreme court's broad reading
of the entire statutory scheme is to infer that, absent another
tortfeasor in the chain, a court is to turn to subdivision 2 to reallo-
cate the loss.
The third area of impact is settlement. The Pierringer release has
been effective and widely used because it allows parties to settle
claims in a piecemeal fashion.155 While there is risk involved for
both parties to the agreement, that risk has proved to be calculable
enough that parties have been able to effectively incorporate the risk
into the "price" of the release without that price becoming prohibi-
tive. One of the major unanswered questions left from Hosley and
Frederickson is, what effect does the release have upon the ultimate
disposition of the uncollectible loss? The Hosley decision does not
answer the question. In Hosley, the releases specifically stated that
the indemnification agreement included indemnification for any real-
located loss. 15 6 Since the plaintiff explicitly agreed to take on this
risk, the court rightly enforced the agreement.' 5 7
The Frederickson decision poses the question without an answer.
The Pierringer release used in Frederickson was of a general variety,
commonly used in personal injury litigation. There, the plaintiffs
agreed to indemnify Hunt for any claims for contribution.158 The
151. See id. at 789.
152. See supra note 150.
153. Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 792.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 103.
157. Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 294.
158. It contained the three necessary parts: (1) release of Hunt for its percentage
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release was totally silent on the question of reallocation.159
Hunt has not participated in the litigation since its inception, hav-
ing settled on the Piemnger release prior to the commencement of
the suit.160 If it is determined that the release does not indemnify
Hunt for reallocation, pursuant to subdivision 3 of the statute, Hunt
is now liable for the entire forty percent of Johnson's uncollectible
loss.161
The impact of such a decision on the future use of Pierringer re-
leases is greater than may be apparent at first glance. It will be felt in
two distinct ways. First, if it is determined that a plaintiff has agreed
to indemnify a settling defendant against the uncollectible loss of a
non-settling defendant, the price of the release will increase dramati-
cally. This is particularly true in cases with potentially large dam-
ages, where the risk associated with an uncollectible loss is high.162
Thus, in the very case in which an injured plaintiff has the most need
of its availability, the price of a settlement and release may be more
than a settling defendant is willing or able to pay. Second, if it is
determined that a plaintiff has not agreed to indemnify a settling de-
fendant against the uncollectible loss of a non-settling defendant, the
settling defendant has not really been released from the litigation at
all.163 The probability of an early settlement on such a basis is dra-
matically decreased.
No matter how the question is decided, the reallocation provisions
have a negative effect upon the incentive of parties to settle. The
most fair decision, the one that gives the parties the most room to
structure their bargain, is to find that there is no indemnification for
reallocated loss absent an express provision in the release.164 This
of fault, (2) reservation of the claims against Johnson and MCHE, and (3) indemnifi-
cation of Hunt for any contribution claims. Helgen interview, supra note 116; see also
Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 791 (plaintiff agreed to satisfy Hunt's share ofjudgment).
159. Helgen interview, supra note 116.
160. Id.
161. The uncollectible loss amounts to $320,000.
162. Frederickson is the quintessential example. It is precisely because the plaintiff
had suffered such catastrophic injuries ($800,000 damages) that the impact ofJohn-
son's uncollectible 40 percent is so great. Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 789.
163. In Frederickson, defendant Hunt settled on a Pierringer for $20,000. Id. In reli-
ance upon this "release" of its obligation, Hunt has not participated in the litigation
proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the case on Septem-
ber 26, 1986. If the court finds that the release does not include indemnification for
reallocation, Hunt is theoretically responsible to Frederickson for $320,000 without
ever having been present in court. While, arguably, Hunt's liability is not resjudicata
and the claim between Frederickson and Hunt can be re-tried. See Hosley, 383
N.W.2d at 293; Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 902-03. Under these circumstances, Hunt can-
not be said to have been released from the litigation.
164. The Pierringer release used in Hosley, when all parties were aware of the likeli-
hood that Johns-Manville's share would be uncollectible, expressly provided for real-
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result, however, may make settlements using a Pierringer release so
expensive that such a release would no longer be of practical use.
CONCLUSION
The reallocation statute creates as many problems as it cures. Ju-
dicial interpretation has clarified some areas and muddied others.
The problems of language and application noted in this Comment
should be addressed by both the legislature and the courts.
Subdivision 1 maintains joint and several liability, which is the
plaintiff's guarantee that she will be fully compensated for her injury.
Despite the fact that our legislature and courts consistently affirm its
continued viabililty, joint and several liability has been eroded by
both legislativel65 and judicial166 exceptions to a point where little
remains of the original rule. The exceptions leave a plaintiff vulnera-
ble to less than full recovery.16 7 At the same time, the retention of
the remnants of the rule make settlement with a single joint
tortfeasor increasingly risky.168 A decision should be made to either
do away with joint and several liability and move to pure fault-based
allocation, or do away with those exceptions that emasculate its
effectiveness.
The general loss reallocation provision found in subdivision 2 of
the statute was designed for a pure comparative fault jurisdiction.169
It has been adopted verbatim in Minnesota, a modified comparative
fault jurisdiction.170 Judicial interpretation has attempted to remedy
the discrepancy.17, The special loss reallocation provision for prod-
ucts liability cases, however, is poorly drafted to achieve its aim. 172 It
should either be redrafted to explicitly apply to multiple manufactur-
ers of a single product, or be interpreted to achieve the same result.
Loss reallocation is Minnesota's most recent effort to allocate the
cost of a given loss in an equitable manner. It enters an area already
replete with common law rules, statutory modification, and judicial
interpretation. The goal behind each principle and statute is justice;
the spirit behind each is equity. Yet time has passed since each was
developed and social concerns have shifted. What was equitable and
location. The risk of reallocation was a known basis of the bargain between the
parties. See supra note 103.
165. See MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02.
166. Supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
167. Frederickson, 390 N.W.2d at 792.
168. See supra notes 28, 161.
169. Compare UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 37, 37-38 (Supp.
1986) with MINN. STAT. § 604.01.
170. Compare UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 37, 41 (Supp.
1986) with MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 2.
171. Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 292-93; see supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
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simple standing alone has become complex and inconsistent in
combination.
The suggestions made above will temporarily repair a few of the
most obvious gaps and overlaps. The tort recovery system is cur-
rently such a complex and patchy affair, however, that each addi-
tional piecemeal attempt to correct perceived inequities affects
multiple areas. This creates new inequities and increases the com-
plexity of the whole. A systematic review of the entire tort recovery
system with an eye toward an equitable and efficient allocation of
loss compensation is urgently needed.
Sharon L. Van Dyck
ADDENDUM
On March 20, 1987 the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its opin-
ion in the Frederickson case. 173 Its holding mischaracterizes the court
of appeals decision and further confuses the correct use of the reallo-
cation statute. The supreme court held that "Johnson's uncollectible
portion of the judgment should be reallocated to Michaud-Cooley,
Hunt, and Frederickson pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2
(1984)."174 In arriving at this conclusion, the court's focus was upon
upholding joint and several liability.175 The court of appeals' reli-
ance upon subdivision 3 was summarily reversed.176 No explanation
was given for the selection of subdivision 2 over subdivision 3 other
than "joint and several liability applies."'77 The court of appeals
correctly applied subdivision 3 analysis to this case. In resolving the
issues under subdivision 2, the supreme court ignored the plain lan-
guage of subdivision 3, and hence ignored the legislative mandate.
Subdivision 3 was meant to apply to the Federickson scenario. It
specifically states that reallocation should not occur "among the
claimant or others at fault who are not in the chain of manufacture or distri-
bution of the product."1 78 Subdivision 3 thus explicitly contemplates
mixed-claim actions in which some at-fault parties are outside the
manufacture/distribution chain. Frederickson's claims were of this
mixed variety. 179
One of the basic rules of statutory construction is "[e]very law
173. Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., Nos. C185-2102 and C3-85-2117
(Minn. Mar. 20, 1987).
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 3 (1986) (emphasis added).
179. Supra note 141.
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shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions."80
The supreme court's resolution of Frederickson via the application of
subdivision 2 renders meaningless an important section of subdivi-
sion 3. This is in conflict with unambiguous legislative intent. The
resultant impact upon litigants is well illustrated by examination of
the Frederickson facts absent Pierringer releases. Under subdivision 3,
manufacturer Johnson's uncollectible 40% is absorbed entirely by
installer Hunt. Hunt is thus responsible for 80% of the judgment,
MCHE for its 12%. Frederickson collects $736,000 of his $800,000
damage award. This result is in keeping with the general policy
choices behind products liability law.181
The result under subdivision 2 is substantially different. Johnson's
40% fault is divided between all parties, including MCHE and Fred-
erickson. MCHE is presponsible for 20% rather than 12%, Freder-
ickson for 13% rather than 8%. MCHE pays more than it should,
and Frederickson absorbs more than he should. The presence of the
Pierringer release merely increases the complexity of the issue and en-
hances the plaintiffs loss. The price of the Pierringer, as noted above,
has become prohibitively high.182
Pursuant to Hosley, multiple manufacturer cases are to be reallo-
cated pursuant to subdivision 2.183 Pursuant to Frederickson, mixed
chain of manufacture/distribution products liability cases are also to
be reallocated pursuant to subdivision 2.184 The only possible re-
maining use for subdivision 3 is the "pure" chain of manufacture
products liability case. This arbitrarily disparate treatment of prod-
ucts liability cases is grossly unfair and cannot have been intended by
the legislature. 185
The faulty analysis and erroneous result in the recent Frederickson
decision is yet another example of the inequities flowing from Min-
nesota's cumbersome loss allocation system. The need for system-
atic review as suggested in the body of this Comment is increasingly
evident. *
180. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1986).
181. Supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
182. Supra notes 162-62 and accompanying text.
183. Hosley, 383 N.W.2d at 293.
184. Frederickson, slip op. at 6.
185. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
* Editor's note: As of the date of this printing, two of the parties in the Frederick-
son case have applied to the supreme court for rehearing. No decision has been made
by the court on these applications.
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